David Hume on Human Understanding

Last updated on: 2019/12/02

Of the different species of philosophy

  • Moral philosophy contributes to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind.
  • Easy and obvious philosophy will always be preferred by mankind above the accurate and abstruse philosophy. Obvious philosophy is more useful and agreeable, which enters into common life. Easy principles actuates men, and reforms their conduct. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, cannot enter into business and action. The abstruse philosophy vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade. Abstruse philosophy is painful, fatiguing, uncertain and erroneous. The abstruse philosophy arises from either human vanity, or the craft of popular superstitions.
  • The most perfect character lies between a philosopher and an ignorant person. A philosopher is who lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from mankind.
  • One advantage from accurate and abstract philosophy, is its subservient to the easy and humane. In every art or profession, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society.
  • Research may appear painful and fatiguing. Research requires mind and body being endowed with vigorous and florid health, and severe exercise to reap a pleasure from what generality of mankind may seem burdensome and laborious.

Of the origin of ideas

Impression and Thought/Idea

Impression and thought are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity on the mind. Impression is a perception by the mind agitated by passion and senses. For example, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or pleasure of moderate warmth, it is impression that mind of the man perceives. Thought is less vivid and force perceived by the mind. The remembering or imagination of the excessive heat is less force and vivid. The ideas presented in poetry can never paint the objects as splendid as the real landscape.

Formation of thoughts/ideas

Our thoughts or ideas are confined within narrow limits. The creative power of the mind on forming ideas, are the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded to us by the senses and experience. For example, when we think of gold mountain. The idea of gold mountain, is the joining idea of gold and mountain. Another example is virtuous horse. We unit shape of horse and meaning of virtue which we can conceive. When we analyze the thoughts, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas which were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. These feelings or sentiment are impression of the mind. Even the idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise and good Being, arises from reflecting the operation of our own mind. A blind man can form no idea of color, and a deaf man can form no idea of sound. There might be other beings who possesses sense that we don’t have, whose ideas we can never have access to. In short, ideas is derived from impressions/experience.

There is a difference between perception of mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or pleasure, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he recalls his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. Faculties of recalling or imagining may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses, but they can never entirely reach the force of the original sentiment. All colors of poetry, however splendid, can never paint objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip.

Of the association of ideas

There are principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind; An idea introduces another idea with a certain degree of method and regularity. There are three principle of connexion of ideas,

  1. Resemblance
  2. Contiguity
  3. Cause and Effect

Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may be divided into two kinds

  1. Relation of Ideas. Examples of relations of ideas are Geometry, Algebra and Airthmetic; in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
  2. Matters of Fact. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible. For exmaple, “the sum will not rise tomorrow” is less intelligible a proposition, than the contrary, “the sun will rise tomorrow”. We should in vain to demonstrate ither one is false or true.

Nature of matter of fact

Reasoning concerning matter of fact is founded on the relations of Cause and Effect. By cause and effect, we can go beyound the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact. For example, if you were to ask a man why he believes his frined is in France, he would give you a letter received from his friend as a reason. A man finding a watch on a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning matter of afct has the same nature. It is constantly supposed, that there is connexion between the present fact and that which is inffered from it. Another example is that the hearing of a rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person.

Origin of the knoledge of cause and effect

Hearing of a rational discourse in the dark is a cause of inferring there is the presence of some person. The knowledge of the relation (cause and effect) is not attained by reasoning a priori. The relation is arises entirely from experience. From the experience, we find that a particular object is constantly conjoined with another object. In our example, “rational discourse” is conjoined with “the present of some person”. If an object is new to a man, he will not be able to discover any of its causes or effects. A most intelligent man, would not infer the fliudity and transparency of water, that water would suffocate him, if he is new to the water. Our reason, unassisted by experience, cannot ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.

Refutation to priori

When any object presented to us, we are required to consult the past experience to pronounce concerning its effects. Imagnation or invention of a particular effect of an object, is arbitrary, when we consult not experience. Given an object, we can conceive hundred different imagined/invented effects. All these effects are equally conceivable and consistent. It is experience that gives us a preference to a particular effect. All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

The utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But in vain, we should attempt to discover the causes of these general causes. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Geometry, when taken into the assitance fo natural philosophy, cannot lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes.

Ignorance and experiments/experience

Our ignorance

  • when asked about a question A, we will give answer B. When again asked about a question regarding B, we will give answer C. A questino of C can be asked again. By repeating the process of asking the question based on the previous answer, at some point, we have to acknowledge the difficulty of coming up with an answer.
  • The force, principle and secret power of nature is concealed from us. Our sense informs us of the color, weight of bread, but our senses nor reason can ever inform us of bread qualities which norish and support of bodies.
  • Two propositions are far from being the same: “I have found that such object has always been attended with such an effect” and “I foresee that other obejcts, which are in appearance similar, will be attended with similar ieffects.” THere is no medium/connexion which may enable the mind to draw such as inference. If there is such a medium, the mind can draw inference at first time he sees the object.
  • Objects’ secrete nature and consequently, all their effects and influence, amy change, without any change in their sensible qualities.

Experiments/experience

All arguments from experience are founded on the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects, which is sum of all our experimental conclusions. The conclusion is not formed by reason.

When a man says “I have found, in all past experience, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers”, and “similar qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers”, the man is saying the same thing twice. All inference from the experience assumes that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. All these arguments are founded the assumption of that resemblance.

Sceptical solution of these doubts

Academic or sceptical philosophy

By imprudent management, the passion for philosophy may only serve to foster predominant inclination and push the mind towards the inclination with more determined resolution. The inclination and push the mind towards the inclination with more determined resolution. The inclination has already draws too much by the bias and the natural temper. While we study with attention the vanity of human life and turn our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honors, maybe we are after all flattering our natural indolence. We may be seeking a pretence of reason to give our natural inclination a full and uncontrolled indulgence.

On the other hand, academic and sceptical philosophy does not indulge our natural inclination. The sceptical philosophy,

  • Talk of doubt and suspense of judgemnt.
  • Talk of danger in hasty determinations.
  • Talk of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries within limits of common life and practice.

Principle of custom/habit

Wherever the repetition of particular act or operation produces a propensity/inclination to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding. We always say, this propensity is the effect of Custom. For example, the constant conjuction of objects heat and flame, we are determined by custom alone to expect heat and flame. By employing the word custom, we do not give the ultimate reason of such a propensity. The principle of custom are well known and universally acknoledged by its effects. We can push our enquiries no farther to give the cause of the custome, with our limited faculty. We must rest contented with custom as the ultimate principle, which we can assign all our conclusions from experience. All infereneces from experience are effects of custom, not of reason.

Our conclusions from experience [in history/book/oral tradition] carry us beyound our memory and senses. The conclusion ensures us matter of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages; But some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. If we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, the conclusion have nothing to be supported.